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PECUNIA NON OLET BUT DOES ROSE MONEY SMELL? 
ON ROSE OIL PRICES AND MORAL ECONOMY IN ISPARTA, 
TURKEY  
 




This paper investigates rose and rose oil production in the province of Isparta, Turkey, with 
reference to the discourses on and procedures of price formation. Farmers have been engaging in 
rose cultivation for over a century and rose oil production is considered to be a traditional industry. 
The market actors for rose oil are global cosmetic and local processing firms and almost all rose oil 
from Isparta is exported. Prices and production have been steadily increasing since 2010. Although 
prices are seen as good, there are concerns about over-production and fierce competition between 
the rose oil firms to buy the harvest, hence pushing up rose prices and, leading to a crash in rose oil 
prices on the world market. Through careful observation of payment and price formation 
procedures, the paper raises issues concerning the moral economy of price formation. Findings are 
provisional and the research is on-going, but the discourse on just prices clearly suggests that value 
judgements are embedded in and implicitly critical of capitalist markets.  
 





Since every commodity, on becoming money, 
disappears as a commodity, it is impossible to tell 
from the money itself, how it got into the hands of 
its possessor, or what article has been changed into 
it. ‘Non olet’, from whatever source it may come.  
 
Marx (1986 [1887]). Capital, vol. 1, p. 112). 
 
Pecunia non olet (money does not smell): this famous saying is attributed to the Roman emperor 
Vespasian (ruled AD 69–79) who is reported to have collected tax money from Rome’s latrines. 
Yet the saying is equally famous through Karl Marx, who used it in volume one of Capital (1887) 
to illustrate how money attached to a commodity through exchange does not reveal its source, has 
no smell so to speak. In this paper, I use the image of ‘non-smelling money’ to look metaphorically 
backwards, at how money earned from smells (of roses, which are distilled into rose oil to become 
raw material for perfumes) loses its ‘smell’ when it becomes price and profit. Smell is being used 
as a metonym for the social and cultural context of rose oil production in Isparta, southwest Turkey. 
Even if rose attar and perfume is the main and most luxurious output from this production, the 
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profits earned are hidden, reminiscent of the fleeting, volatile fragrance of the rose and rose attar. 
In order to follow this process of exchange and transformation, I examine the conditions and 
process of rose farming and the procedure of rose oil production in the region of Isparta. The 
analysis is based on 6 months fieldwork in Isparta, carried out during several visits of different 
lengths in the period 2015–2018.  
The smell I address here is that of roses, specifically that of the fragrant oil-bearing rose, Rosa 
Damascena, which has a restricted blossoming season of about two months a year. The fragrance is 
described as quickly evaporating after harvesting (Baydar & Kazaz, 2013, p. 73), hence the 
distillation process needs to start immediately after roses are picked and processed as full flower 
blossoms. Roses have to be picked only when fully blossomed, not before (when still budding) and 
not after, since if post-blossoming the rose flowers lose their fragrant oil. The urgency of capturing 
the fragrance, however, seems to evaporate once the rose oil is produced. The money to be earned 
from harvested roses and produced rose oil does not reach rose farmers (growers) and rose oil 
producers (processors) until months after the harvest time and in the interim they do not even know 
how much it will be. Harvesting is done within 6–7 weeks from about May till the end of June; yet 
the prices of the roses and rose oil are made public to all the immediate actors only in late 
September or early October.  
In this chapter I examine the factors affecting price formation ethnographically, following Jane 
Guyer (2009). She is not the first to take an interest in the composition of prices, and price 
formation as a process has been central to many economic sociological and economic 
anthropological analyses. These analyses have critically assessed simplistic assumptions about 
price formation (e.g. that price is determined only through the law of supply and demand) by 
positing markets as social fields (Bourdieu, 2005), highlighting the institutional aspects of price 
formation (Veblen, 1994 [1904], cited in Tool, 2002; Beckert, 2011), and underlining classical 
arguments concerning the embeddedness of prices in institutions, power and social relations, from 
Aristotle and Karl Marx to Karl Polanyi and John Kenneth Galbraith (cf. Krul, 2016). My interest 
in the formation of prices in and around the rose oil industry is related to my efforts to explore the 
‘moral dimensions’ of this process, if not the ‘moral economy’ per se (Hann, 2018; Palomera & 
Vetta, 2016).  
The sentiments and norms of traditional obligations as expressed by growers and processors in 
Isparta, drew predominantly on the language and practices of market economy, notably with 
reference to ‘good prices’. The question is how ‘good prices’ are related to a ‘market-based 
economy’ and at the same time linked to moral ideas about ‘just prices’. Even if market-based 
economies at the local scale entail moral judgements and values (such as protecting the local 
growers and the rose as a local and traditional agricultural product), and further mutual obligations 
develop in economic transactions (such as respecting the competitors’ price) (cf. Carrier, 2018), at 
the global end of the production and trade chain price formation increasingly lacks transparency 
and raises anti-market sentiments. These are clearer indicators of the moral dimension in economy 
(Hann, 2018), since public discourses on unjust prices reflect moral outrage and anxiety about the 
globalized capitalist ‘market’ and its local effects. The ‘market’ here consists of three fields: labor 
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market in agricultural production, the market for roses in which rose growers and rose oil 
processors participate, and finally the global market for rose oil in which local rose oil processors 
and international perfume, cosmetic and aroma industry firms participate. Price formation hence is 
influenced by relations between and conditions in all these fields and at different scales of markets.  
Gudeman and Rivera (1990, p. 139–159), discuss “just prices” from the perspective of 
Colombian peasants and suggest that peasants have multi-vocal views on prices, as well as on 
institutions of (market) trade and traders. They argue that the specialization implicated in the 
circulation of products from the locality to the markets through farmers, traders, and intermediaries 
such as transporters lead to the kind of disadvantaged (and marginalized) terms in which the 
peasants think of themselves and their inability to control prices and profits. They contrast 
themselves with the traders as follows:  
[p]ersonal need for a commodity never forces traders to enter the market. In contrast, say the rural people, 
they themselves lack withholding power and have to make transactions based on necessity, which lowers 
their bargaining power (Gudeman & Rivera, 1990, p. 151).  
In the production chains I examine in this paper, I discuss whether and how marginalization, 
disadvantageous terms of trade and comparative advantages may emerge. The main difference, 
however, between the Andean peasant economy examined by Gudeman and Rivera and mine has 
to do with the way Isparta’s rose growers are embedded into the global capitalist market economy. 
Roses in Isparta are cultivated for their good price and extra profits and they are not the only source 
of income for farmers. Furthermore the ecological conditions in Isparta give rose growers a 
relatively strong position where they exercise considerable power through following the market 
principle of demand and supply; they increase or decrease cultivation according to the price of 
roses and can nevertheless survive without it.  
I argue that rose and rose oil production and the way prices are formed should be studied as a 
processual chain of integrated systems of production (of roses), trade (of roses) and production of 
rose oil (Production-Trade-Production), in which uncertainty is partly mediated through sociality 
between rose growers, scale keepers (kantarcıs) in the villages, and regional processors. Within this 
web of sociality prices are expressed as payments and profits are veiled through being related to 
distant markets, where big players engage in transforming the raw product of the rose oil through 
laboratory tests, perfume creation, branding, marketing, and advertisement (cf. Moeran, 2009 for a 
similar analysis of the transformative processes in incense production and marketing in Japan). 
Knowledge of this industry is not complete and is differentially available to local processors, and 
hardly at all to growers. Those processors who have tacit knowledge of these markets have an 
advantage over the growers, but they still have to compete with other processor firms to be able to 
dispose of their product at good prices. Following Elyachar (2012), I suggest that rose processors 
have a differential ‘sense of the market’ which enables them to – more or less - muddle through 
opaque processes of price formation.  
First, I outline the location, the population and economy of the field site. I then describe the rose 
oil industry and how the price of rose oil and of harvested roses is set, drawing on literature in 
economic anthropology. I close by focusing on the articulations of moral dimensions of the 
economy through sociality and mutuality in the process of rose and rose oil production.  
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ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND: THE PROVINCE AND THE CITY OF ISPARTA 
 
Isparta is situated to the north of Antalya, which is internationally known for its beaches along the 
Mediterranean. Being located just to the north of the Taurus mountains and within the Turkish 
‘Lake District’, the province enjoys a Mediterranean climate, with relatively cool summers 
(compared to the coast) and mild winters (compared to central Anatolia); this is conducive to rose 
cultivation. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Isparta is known primarily as an 
agricultural province, growing grain, vegetables and fruit. In recent decades apples, pears and 
cherries have developed into important export cash crops.1  
Rose cultivation in Isparta started in the late Ottoman period (Altıntaş, 2009; Temurçin, 2004). 
There are diverging narratives as to who initiated rose cultivation within and around the city, but 
legend has it that Ismail Efendi was the honorable patron of rose cultivation and first entrepreneur 
of rose oil production. The neighborhood where he is said to have set up the first rose gardens and 
to have lived is named after him as ‘rose grower neighborhood’ (Gülcü mahallesi) – the city of 
Isparta has made the rose its cultural symbol and brand, even if within the city there are no more 
extensive rose gardens nor rose oil production. Today the villages around the city of Isparta are the 
main locations for rose production, though many remember with nostalgia the existence and smell 
of rose gardens within the city boundaries (Karakuş, 2009, pp. 170–174).  
In order to understand the conditions of rose and rose oil production, one needs to look at the 
general economic and socio-demographic features of the province. Isparta’s urban population (60% 
of the provincial total, see Dulupçu & Gövdere, 2012, p. 152) is employed mainly in trade and the 
services sector, with urban incomes derived primarily from rent (renting property to university 
employees and students, and also to military personnel). Rural population decline continues in all 
districts of the region, together with migration to other big cities and other provinces. 
The discourse on the rose oil economy and its relevance for society in the province evokes 
tradition in addition to conservative and religious values. This discourse identifies rose oil as a 
symbol of Muslim culture and cultural consumption (e.g. rose oil is often referred to as being a 
symbol of the Prophet’s facial sweat), rose water is considered a natural and non-alcoholic (hence 
halal) product, desired by many devout Muslims. The director of Gülbirlik (the major cooperative 
in rose and rose oil production in the province discussed below) was cited in a newspaper interview 
as wanting to donate rose water to wash the holy places of Mecca.2 Even if these discourses have 
no direct impact on rose and rose oil production, they show how this special industry is evoked as 
having significance in local culture and tradition, hence as worth engaging with and sustaining.  
 
                                                          
1 In 2014 according to official agricultural statistics, 28% of the area in Isparta was used for agriculture. Of this some 
82.6% is used for growing grains, 2.8% for vegetables and 14.6% for fruit production. See 
http://isparta.tarim.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Detay.aspx?SayfaId=29. Accessed on 11.09.2015.  
2 Roses and rose gardens indeed have long been part of the Islamic and Eurasian cultures as Goody (1993, pp. 101–119) 
illustrates. Goody (1993, pp. 103–106) mentions also the everyday but also therapeutic use of rose water and rose oil in 
Muslim countries from the Middle Ages onwards (see also Altıntaş 2009). For the news item about the director of 
Gülbirlik, concerning donating rose water to Mecca, see http://www.ispartahaberleri.com/isparta-haberleri/isparta-kabeyi-
yikayacak-gul-suyuna-talip-h1110.html, published on 13 May 2013. Accessed on 18 July 2015. 
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ETHNOGRAPHY OF ROSE PRODUCTION AND ROSE OIL INDUSTRY 
 
The rose oil industry is considered one of the most important industries in contemporary Isparta. 
Some 18 firms produce and export rose oil, some also create other rose products like rose concrete 
and rose absolute, all of which are used in products in the cosmetic, aroma, perfume, and food and 
health industries worldwide (Baydar & Kazaz, 2013, p. 26).3 For this, production, distillation and 
extraction machines and some laboratory equipment are necessary, but on the whole it is not 
considered to be a very complicated or sophisticated procedure. The specificity of the production 
has to do with the immediate link between the rose harvest and rose oil production. During the 
harvest season, roses have to be picked daily from sunrise – ideally – for about five to six hours; 
they should not be harvested after 11 a.m. because the sun warms up the roses and causes the 
fragrant oil to evaporate. After harvesting, roses should be delivered to the factories as quickly as 
possible to be poured into cauldrons and then to be filled with water and heated for distillation. 
After about three to four hours and several distillation procedures, the raw rose oil can be collected.  
The ratio of rose to rose oil in the production process is equally crucial: depending on the quality 
of the rose one needs from 2.5 to 3.5 tons of roses to produce one liter of rose oil. The productivity 
of a rose garden, depending on climate, soil, altitude and other factors is typically 3.5 tons from 
five decares (0.5 hectare) of land, meaning that from the harvest of this size rose garden one can 
extract 1 litre of rose oil (Baydar & Kazaz, 2013, p. 8).  
In Isparta province in 2015 roughly 10.000 farms (farming households) were said to engage in 
rose cultivation.4 These households cultivate roses in addition to other agricultural products, and 
practice animal husbandry. Baydar and Kazaz (2013, p. 20) indicate that only 20% of individual 
farm land is used for rose cultivation and that the average acreage under rose cultivation is four to 
five decares.  
According to official statistics, 20,487 decares of land (0.88% of total cultivable land) was 
cultivated for oil bearing roses (and lavender) and some 8,382 tons of roses were cultivated in 
2015.5 Most income (69% of agrarian income) is attained from fruit production, and farmers use 
most of their land for this activity/crop. However, the work load and the complexities of fruit 
cultivation and trade are mentioned as disincentives: rose cultivation does not depend on 
intermediaries (aracı in Turkish, between the market and the producer) and is less vulnerable to 
climatic fluctuations (than cherries for instance). Indeed, rose production involves a much more 
direct connection between harvesting and transfer to the factory than other agrarian products; they 
cannot be stored and need to be transported immediately to the factory. Whether and how scale 
keepers (kantarcıs) can be seen as significant mediators is an issue I deal with below.  
                                                          
3 Rose concrete is a solid extract and rose absolute is liquid. Rose concrete is distilled with hexane as solvent, which is 
different than the water-distillation method for extracting rose oil. Around 350–400 kg of flowers are needed to produce 1 
kg of rose concrete, compared to the several tons of roses being distilled to produce 1 litre rose oil. This makes rose 
concrete also less expensive than the rose oil. Rose absolute is attained from rose concrete through using alcohol. All of 
these products are used in cosmetic and aroma industries. 
4 This is a very rough estimate and even if it is often cited by authorities and the cooperative, is nevertheless challenged 
by some rose oil producers as being an exaggeration.  
5 These are figures taken from the governmental statistics. See http://isparta.tarim.gov.tr/Sayfalar/Detay.aspx?SayfaId=29. 
Accessed on 11.09.2015. They are however challenged by some rose oil producers as being an exaggeration.  
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At harvest time one first needs laborers; for instance, a farming household with three working 
adult household members, needs another two extra laborers at peak season for harvesting about two 
decares. The extra laborers may be relatives, neighbors, friends and/or waged agricultural day 
laborers. As I explain further below, prices for labor is set for each season as payment per kilogram 
picked on the day, the amount is recorded daily and payment is made at the end of the harvesting 
season. After picking, the sacks of roses are brought to the weighing station in the same village and 
are weighed by kantarcıs, men or women who are assigned by the rose oil firms to manage the 
specific weighing stations in the village. In villages where roses are cultivated there are at least five 
or six and sometimes up to eight or 10 such kantarcıs, buying for different factories, processors, the 
cooperative and private firms. Their tasks are to weigh and issue receipts for the amounts collected 
from each farming household each day. They also record the amount picked by each hired laborer, 
which forms the basis for the laborers to claim their pay from their employers, the owner of the 
rose gardens. After weighing and recording the amounts, the sacks are transported by company 
trucks to the factories. The kantarcıs may be members of the Cooperative 6  and/or farmers 
themselves who may have some larger rose gardens. They must enjoy the trust of both the villagers 
and the firms. They are the key mediators between the firms and the rose growers, particularly in 
extending advance payments, for example, to combat agrarian parasites in the rose gardens, but 
also at times offering advance payments to growers for their life-cycle ceremonial expenses. They 
also play a crucial role in recruiting rose producers to sell to particular rose buyers, and also in the 
strategic use of knowledge about rose production levels by households, as I elaborate below.  
The factories are not significant places of work. They have few permanent employees and 
employ up to 10 to 15 workers seasonally, for no longer than two months. Many firms have just 
one or two specialists responsible for the production of rose oil, rose concrete and absolute; (other 
employees include white collar administrators and laboratory technicians, and at least one 
watchman). A few firms produce other natural herbal oils (like lavender and thyme) and some 
larger firms may have more permanent staff and continuous production throughout the year. Rose 
growers feel and say they enjoy close contact with their firms, especially since the kantarcıs are 
trusted and known persons. They are close-by and act as credit-givers on behalf of the rose oil 
firms in the village, an issue I shall come back to when discussing price formation.  
The main labor market issue was the shortage of laborers for harvesting. Small farmers use their 
own household labor and on peak days mobilize their networks of relatives and neighbors. 
However, rural settlements are losing population and the labor supply in the villages is diminishing. 
Young people living in cities are asked and paid by their distant relatives or non-kin rose farmers to 
work as harvesters; young recent rural-urban migrants are the most suitable candidates. In May 
2016 I accompanied rose pickers in two different locations. My impression was that rose pickers 
(mostly middle-aged women) had to work fast, fighting against time, often without a break for 
nearly seven hours; their labor conditions were different than from those in orchards, where 
workers are paid daily wages and not piece rates. This also means that their wages are fixed even 
                                                          
6 The former state owned cooperative Gülbirlik is a major actor in rose cultivation and rose oil production. It is a union of 
cooperatives for producing and buying roses, and producing and selling rose oil; it also has a firm for producing cosmetic 
items. More on the cooperative, see below.  
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when the price of produce is not known. In May 2016 rose pickers were paid 1.20 TL/kg (ca. 37 
euro cents).7 A very able picker might harvest about 35–40 kg a day, depending on the condition of 
the field and the time of season. Despite the very low pay for rose picking, some women said they 
like this work, as they can combine it with other kinds of work (e.g. paid work or unpaid household 
work). One needs to start early, and it is done by midday. Employers, however, complained that 
women recruited for a harvest season did not turn up regularly, presumably because of the low pay. 
Hence the laborers could walk away if they are unsatisfied with the wage, and farmers had to 
struggle to keep laborers if they did not want to leave their gardens uncultivated, by offering them 
better wages (more than the set price for the season) and extra benefits (such as providing them 
with food after the harvest, covering their cost of travel and arranging their travel to the fields at 
their own expense).  
Farmers of larger holdings and some of the big rose oil firms which have bought or rented large 
fields for rose cultivation find it difficult to recruit reliable laborers in adequate numbers. These 
firms with large land holdings reported having to invest extra in providing accommodation to 
seasonal laborers. Migrant seasonal laborers from neighboring provinces, from the Southeast of 
Turkey (mostly Kurds), the local Gypsy population of Isparta, and more recently Syrian refugees 
who seek employment in the agricultural sector were the main population groups recruited. Yet 
legal status (for Syrian refugees without work permits until 2017), accommodation problems (for 
migrant native and Syrian workers) and work ethic (of Gypsies) were constant concerns.  
I carried out interviews with the managers and/or owners of 15 of the province’s 18 exporting 
private firms, in some cases returning for further intensive talks. Some of the private firms are 
small family enterprises, run by the second or third generation. Some are also involved in other 
branches of the industry, but all sold their rose oil and other rose products abroad. A few were 
involved in the cosmetic industry themselves and were in the process of developing their own 
brand of perfumes, rose water, eau de cologne and similar goods.  
Apart from the rose oil distillers and exporters, numerous small firms bought rose water and rose 
petals to produce foods (such as Turkish delight and rose jam), or bought rose water for producing 
cheap cosmetics, soaps, and eau de cologne. The firms producing food for the local markets were 
also the ones buying roses directly in the villages from the farmers, offering the highest prices and 
immediate payment (peşin fiyat, in Turkish), but they bought small amounts and needed mostly 
roses which were not sprayed with chemicals. These products were sold in almost all stores in 
Isparta and were favored presents from the city. The larger and more established export firms 
accused the smaller firms of ruining the city’s reputation, since many produced fake or low-quality 
cosmetic products, which were however affordable for Turkish buyers. These local firms producing 
food and cosmetics for local consumers do not have the capital to invest in the modern factory 
technology of distillation, nor would they have the business connections to export rose oil if they 
were to distill it. Some of the newcomers to the field of rose oil distillation for export indeed found 
                                                          
7 On May 27, 2016, 1 Turkish Lira (TL) was equivalent to 0.30 Euros. In 2018, rose pickers were paid between 1.50 to 2 
Turkish Liras, yet the Turkish currency had lost nearly one fourth of its value. On May 15, 2018, rose picking migrant 
agricultural labourers were being paid 1.5 Turkish Liras per kilo and this was equivalent to 0.29 Euros.  
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it difficult to break into the international market for rose oil and lacked connections and business 
skills.8  
Special mention must be made of the former state-owned cooperative Gülbirlik (meaning ‘rose 
union’), which is considered by all to be a major actor in both rose growing and processing. It is in 
fact a union of six smaller rose producing agricultural cooperatives and of a cosmetic industrial 
firm (http://www.gulbirlik.com/, accessed on 5 August 2017). The cooperative’s history follows 
the industrialization of rose oil production in the region: the first modern rose oil factory in Isparta 
had been established with state funding in 1935 (Altıntaş, 2009, p. 163), and this was followed by 
French investments for a second factory in 1952. The Rose and Rose Oil Producers Cooperative 
Gülbirlik was established in 1954 and took over the latter factory in the same year (Baydar & 
Kazaz, 2013, p. 19). For nearly half a century, it was supported by the state, like other agricultural 
production cooperatives, before being subjected to restructuring and privatization in 2000, 
following the waves of privatization of many formerly state-owned cooperatives and enterprises. 
Presently it owns four rose oil distillation factories and two rose concrete production units 
(http://www.gulbirlik.com/, accessed on 5 August 2017). It has about 8,000 registered members9 
and employs about 40 people permanently as administrators, with various expertise and functions. 
Gülbirlik established the cosmetic firm with the brand name Rosense in 2005 and produces its own 
cosmetic products, which retail all over in Turkey and abroad 
(http://www.rosensemagaza.com/sayfa/hakkimizda, accessed on 5 August 2017).  
Gülbirlik differs from other buyer processor firms in that it represents growers, given its history 
and structure, and it sees itself as a guarantor for the growers’ share in rose production. Although it 
is no longer financially protected by the state as in the previous years, it is still seen as being the 
major force for the continuation of rose production in the province. The managers of Gülbirlik in 
fact were keen to emphasize that the farmers would not continue growing roses if the cooperative 
were not there. Hence, even if the Cooperative does not give the best price and does not buy the 
largest share of the rose harvest from the growers, it is a major actor in the rose oil industry and 
especially in the formation of rose and rose oil prices. The most significant role of Gülbirlik 
concerning the price of roses is that in earlier times they were the first to declare the sale price of 
roses (taban fiyatı in Turkish, which means base price) and the private firms adjusted their own 
prices to that, offering a small amount on top of Gülbirlik’s price. This tradition has been kept since 
the privatization of Gülbirlik in 2000. What consequences these price setting mechanisms have is 
an issue which I address further below.  
 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN ROSE OIL PRODUCTION 
 
Rose oil and other rose products are considered a traditional industry, which has given the province 
a name and brand (Sallan Gül, Yılmaz, Ergun, & Alican, 2010). Yet many are worried that it might 
                                                          
8 My several contacts with international cosmetic firms (mostly in organic cosmetics) support this impression; they are 
selective about their business partners and prefer long-term relations. 
9 See http://www.gulbirlik.com/, accessed on 5 August 2017. According to the Cooperative’s managers, the number of 
active members ‘regularly selling rose to the Cooperative’, however, is some 3000.  
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share the fate of another traditional industry, that of hand-woven carpets, which were known as 
Isparta carpets until the 1970s and 1980s (see Erçetin, 2014, pp. 102–124). Since the introduction 
of machine-woven carpets, none have been produced in the province by traditional methods.  
Despite these anxieties, rose oil production remains an attractive industry, primarily because of 
rising prices and earnings for all (growers as well as processors). In the history of rose production 
in the province, however, there have been several cases of boom and bust, for example, in 1986, in 
the 1990s, the early 2000s, and in 2010.10 My interlocutors at Gülbirlik explained this phenomenon 
by the attractiveness and ease of rose growing. When rose and rose oil prices increase, this causes 
overproduction and flooding of the market with rose oil, and rose processors have difficulty in 
selling their produce on the global market, where demand is stable. Hence rose oil prices 
commonly crash, leading to a crash in rose prices. Such boom-bust cycles lead rose growers to give 
up their fields and some rose oil processors have closed down. At boom times, when rose oil prices 
increase and cause high rose production, new small and middle size firms start up business; this 
seems to have been the case since 2010. After 2015 more established and older processor firms 
complained about the many newcomers to the market, fiercely competing with them to buy the 
roses, as I shall elaborate further below. Official sources claim that the province supplies at least 
50–60% of world market demand for rose oil.11 Gülbirlik, representing the majority of growers in 
Isparta, have been warning against overproduction of roses and rose oil since 2012,12 demanding 
state control of production areas and state support in improving the quality of rose cultivation.13 
The rose gardens need to be renewed every 20 to 30 years as the yields decrease, hence Gülbirlik – 
and private processors – were seeking state support for the farmers who want to renew their 
gardens and be subsidized during those few years of planting new rose plants.  
Boom and bust and how to prevent price falls are a major concern in the province. Several firm 
owners support the idea of developing and enlarging the area of rose cultivation, encouraging more 
organic cultivation (as a response to world market changes and demand) and improving quality 
control.  
In general, some of the problems related to rose cultivation were of a more universal character 
and related to demographic problems in the rural sector in recent decades; these are issues which 
need to be dealt with separately. In Isparta, decline in rural population and increase in city 
population are common trends, as in many other parts of Turkey and the world. Hence agrarian 
land ownership and agricultural production are said to need reorganization. Privately owned 
processor firms tended to view small land ownership as an obstacle to improving the quality and 
productivity of gardens, whereas for Gülbirlik small land owners were their actual and potential 
members. Accordingly, its managers favored varying kinds of state support and incentives for the 
                                                          
10 For fluctuations of rose cultivation areas and prices in Isparta between 1987 and 2010 see Yürekli Yüksel (2010, p. 3). 
Moeran (2010, p. 425) mentions similar fluctuations and struggles over rose prices in Bulgaria, the other major country 
for growing Rosa Damascena and producing rose oil.  
11 Altıntaş (2009, p. 169) claims that contemporary Turkey supplies 70% of the world demand, with Isparta the leading 
province. In an interview, she also suggested that rose oil has a very broad range of use in food industry because it is a 
basic natural essence for aromas, used even in the cigarette industry.   
12 See http://www.bomba32.com/haber/isparta/gulde-tehlike-canlari/3432.html, accessed on 14 January 2018. There have 
been earlier warnings by Gülbirlik during previous boom and crash cycles, see their journal (Gülbirlik 2007, pp. 6-7). 
13 Internal and unpublished report by Gülbirlik (2011, p. 2).  
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farmers. Nevertheless, they also saw the continuous increase in the area of cultivation as a potential 
danger which could lead to a sharp fall in rose and rose oil prices.  
 
ROSE OIL INDUSTRY AND PRICE FORMATION 
 
As indicated in the introduction, each year the price of roses is determined not at the time of 
harvesting, but after the roses have been processed and the products have been sold on the world 
market. The price of roses in 2015 was ‘declared’ by Gülbirlik at the end of September (in the 
period 2016–2018, it was in October), hence causing three or more months of uncertainty after 
cultivating and processing the roses.  
Rose production is easy, but productivity is dependent on climatic conditions. If winter has been 
late, cold with sudden spells of frost, or if spring rain is insufficient, the harvest may be low and 
there will be a shortage of roses for the processor firms. This was the case in 2015. In 2016, winter 
was exceptionally mild, hence the roses blossomed earlier than usual; the harvest started at the 
beginning of May. In 2018, the harvest had already started by mid-April, ending in late May. As in 
the harvesting seasons in 2016, 2017 and 2018, frequent rains during harvesting prolong the work 
and increase the length of harvest time.  
Chronic shortages of labor may cause delays in picking the roses, causing the oil content to 
evaporate. When conditions of ecology and labor are fulfilled, the firms produce the oil and the 
rose concrete according to their capacities and available technologies. They process the harvested 
roses depending on their quality into either rose concrete or rose oil; for this they need to estimate 
which one would sell better that year. Firms in France, Switzerland, USA, UK, Japan and Germany 
are the most important buyers (Altıntaş, 2009, p. 173; Baydar & Kazaz, 2013, p. 21) and more 
recently Middle Eastern buyers have joined the market for buying rose oil and rose concrete. The 
sale of rose oil and rose concrete to these cosmetic firms takes place during the late summer and 
early autumn months. The processors say that the buying companies wait for their price offers. The 
processors then make their offers on the basis of the prices from the previous year and their own 
estimates about the overall production level of rose oil and rose concrete in the region that year. 
But these production levels are estimates only and how much rose oil and concrete are actually 
produced by each company remains a company secret. Experienced processors of course know 
roughly how many tons of roses were cultivated that year (and the estimates of their own kantarcıs 
are crucial here) and they also approximately know the production capacity of the rose oil firms in 
Isparta. Nevertheless, they wait and try to find out what price other companies are offering. 
Furthermore, the quality and amount of roses used in producing a liter of rose oil remains a 
company secret. Rose growers, for instance, do not have scientific measures or means for assessing 
the quality of their own roses other than the fact that processor firms continue their payment 
relationships.14 The logic is that if their roses are of good quality, the processors would be keen on 
                                                          
14 Other than the rule of thumb about the altitude, soil quality of the location and good care of the gardens, rose farmers 
do not have any means to be sure about the quality of their roses. The final quality is assessed when rose oil firms offer 
their product on the world market; it is often the buying perfume and cosmetic firms who measure the quality from 
samples and then make their price offers. 
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maintaining trade relations with them and willing to make advance payments and offer ‘good’ 
prices at the end of the season. Rose growers’ lack of knowledge about processing, marketing and 
the quality of rose oil was one of the aspects contributing to the opaqueness of price formation. As 
one rose grower observed, when asked why they do not establish a distillation unit close to the 
village and get more direct advice about tending their gardens which suffer at times from parasites, 
‘then we could learn how the whole production system works’. She implied that attaining more 
knowledge about production would raise growers’ bargaining power. 
In this web of relationships and transactions between the processors, the Cooperative, rose 
growers and kantarcıs, and during this period of ‘price formation’, there are several guidelines or 
unwritten rules. (1) The private processors wait for the Agricultural Cooperative Gülbirlik to 
‘declare’ its buying price for roses. (2) They try to understand what the components of that price 
are (e.g., cooperative membership fees, various kinds of taxes).15 (3) They offer a price which does 
not ‘exceed too much’ the price offered by the Cooperative. The common formulation goes 
something like this: Gülbirlik’s (price) plus 50 Kuruş (equivalent to half of one Turkish lira).  
I argue that there is a good deal of secrecy and ‘mystery’ about this price formation. In 2016, in 
the weeks after the harvest, the firm owners or managers expressed uncertainty, saying that they 
had a rough idea, but that it was not a fixed price yet. The reason why the private firms followed 
the price set by the Cooperative was – as some suggested – the ‘security’ the Cooperative was able 
to offer to rose growers. Both Cooperative and private firms argue that the rose growers would 
prefer to sell to the Cooperative because (as a former state coop), it ‘naturally’ defends their 
interests. Many private firms see themselves at a disadvantage because of this, but at the same time 
accept the Cooperative’s mimicry of ‘being like the state sector’ as a historically formed attitude 
and a given. This is reminiscent of the part played by ‘custom’ in price formation, where it plays a 
stabilizing and representational role, as described by Guyer (2009, p. 212). Furthermore, in 
conversation, the processors as well as the growers were almost unanimous that the ‘declaration of 
a minimum rose price’ by the Cooperative was a necessary restraint on private firms’ ‘greed’ and 
possible attempts to dominate or monopolize the market. The common rhetoric from private firms 
was not to ‘cool off’ or ‘disappoint’ (küstürmek) the rose growers, who historically and ‘naturally’ 
would support the Cooperative. Rose farmers had indeed given up cultivating roses and left their 
gardens uncultivated and changed to another produce on several occasions. As explained above, 
when prices crashed many farmers changed to planting fruit trees instead. One of the farming 
families, for instance, had planted a new rose garden in which the roses were placed between rows 
of newly planted cherry trees. In 2016, they said that they would not keep both since the plants 
would hinder one another for lack of space and sunlight. They wanted to wait to see how prices 
developed and give up on one of them accordingly, and indeed in 2018 when I revisited them, they 
had cut down some of their cherry trees and were already harvesting the roses.  
The rose growers too, wait until the Cooperative declares that year’s price of roses. The growers 
get paid for the quantity of roses they deliver each year, but this payment is usually less than the 
                                                          
15 The Cooperative offers different prices to the member growers on the basis of duration of membership, I was told. Also 
the taxes and payments to the Chamber of Trade etc. are also accounted for, and the private firms adjust their own prices 
accordingly.  
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total amount of roses multiplied by the fixed price, because almost all growers have annual 
agreements to sell their roses to one or several rose oil firm(s) and receive advance payment before 
harvest time.16 After the harvest they receive the remaining payment for deliveries from that year 
and simultaneously a contract for the coming year. Therefore, the announcement of the ‘price of 
roses’ means that the price is for settling the accounts of advance payments and remaining 
payments: prices are in fact payments, a distinction highlighted by Jane Guyer. She reminds us of 
Polanyi’s discussion of prices and payments, where he contrasted fees as payments to prices as 
exchange (Guyer 2009, p. 215, citing Polanyi 1977).17 I shall return to this point below.  
The advance payments (called avans ödeme in Turkish) were introduced by the private firms to 
secure the growers’ harvest and delivery of a certain quantity each year. 18  The amount is 
necessarily an estimate since the harvest may fluctuate, and growers may deliver more or less than 
expected. In earlier years the Cooperative apparently criticized the advance payments made by 
private firms as a mechanism promoting an artificial increase in the price of rose, hence causing 
unjust prices; they express this as “unethical and unpreventable unfair competition” (in Turkish 
“etik olmayan ve önlenemeyen haksız rekabet”) in their reports.19 But in 2015, when rose growers 
had already been increasingly selling to private firms which pay these advance payments, the 
Cooperative started paying advance payments as well. The Cooperative explains this payment, 
however, as the distribution of gains due to fluctuations in exchange rates and not as ‘advance 
payments’; the private firms see it differently. The advance payments were more controversial a 
year later, when some complained that they were inflationary. The kantarcıs seemed to play a 
crucial role in guiding the offers of advance payments, and also in checking the reliability of the 
farmer (for delivering the harvest or being able to pay back any excess advance). Some private 
processors talked about a ‘war’ between rose buyers, alleging that some other buyers were like 
‘cannibals’ (yamyam, in Turkish), trying to ‘eat up’ one another by offering ever higher prices to 
the growers. The image of rose buying firms engaging in unbounded and immoral competition with 
one another was confirmed by some cooperative managers, who would accuse the private sector of 
greed and ‘having an eye on what is on the growers’ table’ (sofraya göz dikmek), suggesting that 
the food on the table, and hence livelihoods, would be in danger.  
All payments to farmers in 2015 and 2016 were made without full legal endorsement. The 
farmers signed agreements with the firms and advance payments were recorded on paper. Yet the 
processor firms were not keen to take any legal action (and said this has never happened), if the 
promised quantity of roses was not delivered. The contracts (and debts) were simply extended to 
the following year. One kantarcı said that he would be liable for the amount of money which had 
been lent for distribution to the farmers, and the kantarcıs would have to recoup the payment from 
each indebted farmer. In this way the processors could be seen as acting as ‘informal’ banks, giving 
credits (on behalf of processor firms) on the basis of trust and social relations, without interest. The 
                                                          
16 They can and do often sell their roses to more than one buyer, especially if they have larger land holdings.  
17 Guyer (2009, p. 215): “Money as exchange is for ‘the acquisition […] of desired goods” (Polanyi 1977: 104), whereas 
money given in payment “is the discharge of an obligation by handing over quantified units” (Polanyi, p. 105). She 
suggests that the former reflects primarily market forces; the latter social relations.  
18 This may be as long ago as the1980s, when numerous new private firms entered the rose oil market.  
19 Unpublished report made available by Gülbirlik to the author.  
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role of the kantarcıs is to secure a strategic distribution of debts, tying the growers to the processors 
and then collecting the harvest/debt from the growers.20  
  
                                                          
20 The kantarcıs are commonly paid a percentage per kilo rose they collect from the farmers. Some of them (as in the case 
of the Güneykent cooperative, which has separated itself some years ago from Gülbirlik) do not pay this percentage and 
the task is carried out by a member of the cooperative, I was told. When kantarcıs take on this role of distributing 
advance payments to the farmers from the total lump sum provided by the processor firm, I assume (but cannot confirm) 
that they may be getting a special payment for their efficiency.  
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Table 1. Rose and Rose Oil Prices in Isparta (2010–2017). 
Year Rose Price (TL/Kg) Rose Price (Euro/Kg) Rose Oil Price 
(Euro/Kg) 
2010 1.85 0.95 5,250 
2011 2.20 0.92 5,500 
2012 3.00 1.28 6,250 
2013 3.50 1.40 7,250 
2014 4.20 1.45 7,000 
2015 5.80 1.93 9,000 
2016 7.65 2.26 11,000 
2017 8.70 2.04 ca. 9,000 
 
 
Table 1 shows rose and rose oil prices in Isparta between 2010 and 2017. Comparing the price 
increase for roses one sees that in Euros the increase from 2010 to 2016 is more than double; but 
for rose growers the price of roses calculated in Turkish liras rises more than fourfold. For rose oil, 
the price increase in Euros within the same period of 2010 to 2016 is slightly more than 100%. In 
2017, rose oil prices were reported to have crashed; in late summer there were rumors that some 
firms were having difficulty selling their rose oil for even 9,000 Euros, hence 2,000 Euros less than 
the previous year. Gülbirlik decided not to crash the price of roses, however, and paid even 
somewhat more than the previous year in Turkish liras, although the international Euro price 
decreased. As rose farmers are paid in Turkish lira and the rose oil producers sell their rose oil 
abroad and are paid in foreign currency, keeping the rose price at a satisfactory level for rose 
growers was still possible, due to currency exchange rates.21 In 2016, all parties were declaring 
themselves satisfied and talked about ‘good prices’. In 2017, some of the private sector rose 
processors were seriously worried about not being able to sell their produce, especially if they 
specialized in rose oil production alone. Gülbirlik gave press interviews highlighting the large sums 
of foreign currency earned through export in Isparta’s rose industry, yet the figures cited reflect an 
emphasis on rose concrete production and sale in comparison to rose oil.22 Rose concrete is more 
often and broadly used in the cosmetic industry and is cheaper than rose oil; the latter is an 
essential ingredient for some of the traditional trademarks of exquisite and expensive perfumes.   
 
                                                          
21 Currency exchange rates have been strongly fluctuating since October 2017 when rose prices were declared. On 
January 14, 2018, 8.70 TL was equivalent to 1.90 Euros, but on July 12, 2018, it had dropped to 1.55 Euros.  
22 See https://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-turkiye-ekonomisine-40-milyon-avroluk-gul-duren-10120739/ published 
on October 11, 2017, and http://www.haberturk.com/yerel-haberler/haber/9652954-ispartadan-30-milyon-avroluk-gul-
ihracati, published on October 7, 2016, both accessed on 12 January 2018. In 2017 1,500 kg rose oil and 15 tons rose 
concrete was produced, when the harvest is said to have been over 8,500 tons of roses. In 2016, it has been estimated that 
rose harvest was about slightly over 7,000 tons, and 1,300 kg rose oil and 15 tons rose concrete had been produced. These 
figures show that even if the harvest has increased significantly from 2016 to 2017, the rose oil and rose concrete 
production have not followed suit at the same rate.  
Rose Oil Prices and Moral Economy in Isparta 
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to 
appear here (https://pure.mpg.de/). Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald 
Group Publishing Limited. DOI: 10.1108/S0190-128120190000039004 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: THE MORAL DIMENSION AND JUST PRICES IN THE ROSE 
OIL ECONOMY 
 
The idea of moral economy, as Hann (2010, 2018), Carrier (2018) and others have commented, has 
been conceptualized and developed primarily in relation to small towns and industrial 
manufacturing. Scott (1976) is commonly associated with applying the concept to the rural context, 
studying Southeast Asian peasants’ concepts of justice and the subsistence ethic in relation to rural 
production (see also Luetchford, 2012). In my view, these discussions on the moral economy of the 
peasants in Scott’s sense cannot be applied to Isparta’s rose growers. Rose cultivation is considered 
as a bonus, as a commodity and source of an extra ‘good’ income. It is a side income providing 
extra money, and it is flexible because it is easy to start and give up.  
Nevertheless, the formation of prices, that is, the annual increase in rose and rose oil prices, were 
seen with apprehension. The growers evaluated increases in rose prices positively, yet they were 
aware of the rate of increase in rose oil prices and did not want to miss out on the best offers from 
processor firms. In those villages where rose growing is intensive and almost all households engage 
in it, processor firms competed for the growers’ roses and kantarcıs had to use various strategies 
and increase mechanisms of sociality to convince farmers to sell to their particular firm. In 
Güneykent, for instance, which is such a center of rose cultivation, there were ten kantars (scales) 
for buying roses between May and June 2016, kantarcıs lined up often next to one another on the 
rural settlement’s main roads. As rose prices promised to be ‘good’ again in 2016 and even in 
2017, farmers expressed their expectations that higher rose oil prices might bring them better rose 
prices. Farmers were aware of rose oil prices but did not pay much attention to them, since the 
actual crash in rose oil prices in 2017 was not mentioned in the news. In 2018, the rose growers 
were still expecting a rise in rose prices and on the whole were unaware or unwilling to believe in 
the crash of rose oil prices, and that processors have not been able to sell their rose oil. The rose 
price which was made public in October 2018 had gone indeed down to the price of 2016.  
The buyers of roses, that is the processor firms, could be thought to have the obvious advantage 
in that they are informed about the demand for rose oil and possibilities of expansion on the world 
market. Nevertheless, they also express great concern that this demand might crash (as happened 
again in 2017), and that the international cosmetic industry and their traditional partner firms will 
(and do) not buy rose products at these constantly increasing price levels. Processor firms compete 
with one another to buy the best (e.g., roses from the slopes which are considered to contain a 
higher percentage of fragrant oil) and most roses, they also compete with one another to offer good 
prices to the cosmetic industry and to maximize their profits.  
This is where transparency becomes opaque. The quality and the quantity of roses used in 
producing a litre of rose oil, as well as the amount of rose oil produced remain a company secret. 
Furthermore, the profits of the processors remain a vague issue and hence a source of mistrust for 
rose growers (cf. Luetchford, 2012). The small farmers in Costa Rica studied by Peter Luetchford 
say that cutting out the intermediaries from trade relations would be an important strategy for 
restoring justice in exchange (2012, p. 403). Gudeman and Rivera (1990) report similar concerns 
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among the peasants in Colombia. In the case of Isparta, the kantarcıs cannot be considered as 
intermediaries in the same sense as has been discussed for other agricultural produce like coffee 
(Luetchford, 2008), tea (Besky, 2014) or cut flowers (Ziegler, 2007). It is the price relationship 
between the cosmetic and perfume industries and the processor firm which is the source of lack of 
clarity and trust.  
The payments made by processors on the one hand, give them a morally anchored if not superior 
position in the exchange relationship with the growers, since they offer advance payments for the 
harvest before the harvest season. These function through social relations and provide security, and 
are emphasized over and above being simply about prices and the market. Hence with this strategy 
the non-transparent profits are, if not legitimized, at least veiled. In this respect, the strategy of 
advance payments although resembling bank credits, differ from these in the following ways: they 
are offered to growers without interest, quite often are not legally endorsable contracts, and they 
are administered through intermediaries in the villages in personalized and informal ways. One 
processor said, for instance, that he knows the farmers so well that he can estimate when they 
would need cash, and that he also buys other produce (such as animal products) from them. This 
indicates the multi-layered character of his relations with farmers. The purpose of advanced 
payments is recognized by all; it is to bind the rose farmer to the processor. But this binding is 
partly veiled and embedded in sociality; it is a moral obligation to give the harvest to the rose oil 
firm from which one has taken advance payments (i.e. mutual moral obligations, as discussed by 
Carrier, 2018). Some claim that the processor firms in their effort to bind the farmers with this 
moral (and hardly legally backed) obligation ask farmers if they want money before the harvest and 
independent of the rose money payment dates. They offer money whenever the farmer is in need, in 
installments and without any complicated bureaucratic procedures (without providing collateral), 
but primarily on the basis of trust with the firm’s kantarcı.  
As discussed above, the kantarcıs take responsibility for making payments to the farmers and 
collecting them back from them. They themselves are financed by a large sum of money from the 
processor firm, which they recoup in harvested roses in May and June. If the farmer brings in less 
than the amount agreed upon at the time of receiving the advance payment, then the remaining 
amount of harvest/debt/money is transferred to the next year. The kantarcıs employed by the 
processor firms also make agreements about their pay by the same firms; sometimes this payment 
is left ambivalent, if the relationship is one of trust, lasting across generations (of firm owners and 
kantarcıs) and they might formulate it as a ‘satisfactory payment’. 23 The idea, therefore, is to 
continue the payment and exchange relationship, providing the kantarcıs ‘keep’ the farmers, and as 
long as the farmers bring in the harvest, and the processor firms tolerate the delays and unfulfilled 
promises of the rose harvest. Along these lines of relations, where actors are entangled in the 
process of growing and processing roses and selling them so that payments in line with the prices, 
the components of the price are transformed and rendered ambivalent, without smell, non olet. In 
                                                          
23 In general kantarcıs are paid according to the amount of rose they buy for the firm, per kg 10 kuruş, for instance. The 
kantarcıs working for the Cooperative were paid in this way. But there were cases where the processor firm owners 
would also be involved in long-term relationships with the kantarcıs and hence be promising but not precise about the 
payments at the beginning of the season.  
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this way a financial relationship is transformed or euphemized as a social relationship. This allows 
processors to control growers to a certain extent and divert attention away from markets and prices.   
To conclude, I return to Jane Guyer’s warning in her 2009 contribution to the book Market and 
Society, that taking price as the simple mediator between supply and demand would be a fallacy, 
and that there are good reasons for ‘making explicit’ ethnographically the components of price for 
understanding the moral dimension of economies. That price veils value has been a long-
established argument since the time of Marx.  
Elyachar has investigated the nature and embeddedness of the markets in the Middle East and 
reminds us of the region’s long and earlier histories of globalization, of markets and states, and 
early monetization (2005, p. 23). She argues that, contrary to the opposition between gift and 
market economies as suggested by Mauss, Malinowski and Adam Smith, gift economies have been 
as integral parts of these markets as commodities and monies (Elyachar, 2005, pp. 21–23). The 
entanglements between the payments and prices, and the sociality involved in making the price of 
rose and rose oil may well be pre-market and pre-capitalist as well as capitalist. This needs to be 
pursued by further exploration of the gift, payment and prices in Turkey on a broader scale.  
In her work on the public sector and markets in Egypt, Elyachar describes a state employee at a 
bank who skillfully manages bank loans and access to markets for customers with his “sense (hiss) 
of the market” (2012, p. 78). For Elyachar, this is skillful employment of tacit knowledge. Tacit 
knowledge, as explored extensively by Michael Polanyi, indicates “unsystematized, unverbalized 
forms of knowledge that were integrated into the body itself, rather than being formed in the brain 
through the study of books” (Elyachar, 2012, p. 83). Many of the processor firm managers and 
owners I have talked to suggested to me also this ‘feeling for the market’, that they had to muddle 
through the possible price changes and “guesstimate” the rose harvest. Their ‘feeling for the 
market’ also functioned to veil price formation.24  
To understand the tacit knowledge about and veiled components of price making in the rose oil 
industry and to clarify the tensions inherent in this process of price making and production 
planning strategy, I have examined the social relations around payments and prices. On the whole, 
mutual harmony and benefits for all are emphasized in conversations about rose oil production. 
Firms, the Cooperative and growers share concerns about improving quality and sustainability and 
also keeping prices stable. Yet knowledge about international firms and the world market for 
cosmetic products is often presented as hardly attainable. The rose grower cited above who notes 
that attaining more knowledge about production would raise growers’ bargaining power is a case in 
point. Why they do not indeed engage in organizing their own cooperative and production unit was 
explained by this farmer in terms of a lack of time and knowledge. The moral dimension of the 
price for her was not an urgent issue, as long as the prices were ‘good’, and the household could 
maintain its livelihood and a good rural life. Whether this diversified mode of livelihood with rose 
cultivation as an additional source of income would be reproducible for the next generations 
remains an open question.  
                                                          
24 This ‘feeling for the market’ resonates the ambiguities involved in perfume markets, as discussed by Moeran (2005). 
He points out to the paradox between the contextually specific character of olfactory cultures and that nevertheless the 
global perfume marketing strategies claim ‘a universal semiotic communication’.   
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